Doubt, Wittgenstein, a Refutation

To cast off the idiot Questioner, who is always questioning,
But never capable of answering; who sits with a sly grin
Silently plotting when to question, like a thief in a cave;
Who publishes Doubt and calls it knowledge

William Blake, Reason and Imagination.

I recently read an introduction to Wittgenstein, the bookshop having gotten this instead of the Tractatus book that had actually been ordered in my effort to introduce myself to this thinker's thought. Anyway, having gotten the tedium of the scene-setting out of the way I'll move onto the main point which relates to W's overcoming of a Descartean question of doubt, ie how can one know anything is real as perhaps what one imagines to be real is merely a dream or some such....in short how can one trust in the reality of reality. Or at least I think that's the essence of the matter.
I am dependent on my middleman's guidance as to how Wittgenstein shot this thought down, but I found his refutations not quite as potent as could have been, and a bit tedious. What Wittgenstein's points are I'm afraid I've not the inclination to search and describe, but my position is that that there is a very direct way to attack the matter, and in a manner so close and apparently natural to Wittgesntein's own way of thinking as for it to be very likely that W did in fact use the following argument elsewhere, and if so excuse my ignorants. Whether this is the case or not, this refutation is on the basis of language itself. This relates somewhat to an earlier piece I wrote here.

To say anything is to involve oneself necessarily in an acceptance that the language one is using is real and imbued with meaning; that the words one is using- if used correctly, ie meaningfully- are meaningful. This is the necessary ground from which one can say anything. So to ask the very question- how can I trust in the reality of the 'real'- is to begin with the foundation that language is real and that one is engaging in a meaningful and real act. To accept the reality of anything- in this case, language- is necessarily to accept the reality of reality. Reality cannot exist within unreality.

The position of Doubt is contrarily a nihilistic intellectual proposition in the true sense, within the framework of which one cannot grant oneself the liberty of believing language to be real and intrinsically meaningful. And so, within this framework of doubt the question of doubt cannot be asked, as to ask the question requires an acceptance of the very reality or meaningfulness of language which doubt, if true to itself, must doubt. And so, since the question of doubt cannot be formed, then doubt cannot exist, as doubt requires a mind utilising language so as to doubt.
Doubt is an intellectual activity, and all intellectual activity necessarily involves a faith in the reality of the language one is using, be it mathematical, linguistic or otherwise. This is the necessary ground.
All in all, the sceptical position is self-contradictory, and should be destroyed as a sensible proposition immediately at source.

To sum up: To ask the question of Doubt is to accept the reality of the language used in the asking, which is to refute the question.