Logical Opposites

A little further on in Russell's History of Western Philosophy, and Plato's examination and perceived refutation of universal flux is examined and criticised by Russell, though whatever their attitudes to universal flux or lack of is not the issue here  but instead what is of interest is a point within their time-stretched dialogue where is written:

Plato gets his results by applying to processes of continuous change such logical oppositions as perceiving and not-perceiving, knowing and not-knowing.

Russell describes the process of a person disappearing from view when viewed and finally not viewed in fog as a gradual process and so the logical opposites of perceiving and not-perceiving nothing like as clearly demarcated and fixed as Plato likes to assume. However, whatever they're getting worked up about is not the point here, and what I would like instead to look at is this notion of logical opposites, which may then put in focus the broader investigation as a sensible, or not, dynamic of language.

An opposite in a pure 'logical' sense is where two opposing entities perfectly balance each other out, or negate each other, leading, where the two come in contact, to a state where neither exists. Thus minus two is the opposite to plus two, and their set in motion against one another results in nought. They perfectly oppose each other; are logical opposites, i.e. are on precisely opposite sides from a definite point of demarcation, here being zero. Minus two does not exist however in reality outside of such language forms - linguistic or mathematical. You can have two of something, lets say shoes, but you cannot have minus two shoes. It's a senseless notion. So there are no opposites in a numerical descriptive sense in the world of ordinary reality.

Another notion of opposition might be black and white, but logical opposites negate each other, leading to nought or non-existence, whereas black and white coming in contact result not in nothing but grey. So they are not opposites, but simply different. Similarly, and more obviously, fat is not opposite to thin. Whether it's even meaningful to even talk of fat and thin coming into contact in the form of a kind of experimental equation is very doubtful, but even if it is permitted, this 'conflict of opposites' of fat and thin does not yield nought or the negation of the two, but something else altogether, if indeed anything. So again these are not opposites, and the same with tall and short, happy and sad, and so on. These are different, perhaps substantially different but not opposites.

And then the notion of perceiving and not-perceiving that Russell and Plato consider such logical opposites, from which acceptance they proceed with their discussion across the ages as to flux or not. I am now looking at a wall and the many other things within that visual field. It makes no sense to talk of an opposite to such experience, and the alleged logical opposition of not-seeing isn't something which occurs. There is no such phenomenon as not seeing something, or not eating, not running, etc. This is merely words without reference to anything. And also as in the mathematical example, the interaction of two logical opposites leads to nought, whereas this not-perceiving is already nought; and nought interacting with a positive does not produce nought. Instead the positive remains as it is. And since this notion of not-perceiving is nothing, a non-event, how can it be meaningful to talk of anything interacting with nothing? There is nothing to interact with. No interaction occurs.

The only sense in which it is meaningful to talk of logical opposites is in mathematics. And so whereas Plato and Russell imagine that they are having a genuine intellectual investigation of some real issue, their words instead refer to nothing; their discussion, as a dynamic of language which is of course what it can only be, doesn't actually exist as it's without meaning, and logical language without meaning is simply an unreal illusion.

I am very threadbare in my knowledge of the following, but the very notion of a conflict of opposites as a creative force, such as seems to be a notion of Hegel's, is nonsensical, as there are no such opposites apart from within mathematics, and even within mathematics where the opposites meet, the conflict or union of these opposites results not in some creative new synthesis but simply nought.

Greek Void

I've read very little of the holy edifice of Western philosophy, but am reading Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy at the moment, which seems to fit something like my needs on the subject and Russell quite an enjoyable guide. And so to the point. In the initial movements of this history, in the ancient or Greek section, the subject of the void crops up once or twice, and on I think the second substantial mention of this void, Russell quotes from Plato's Timaues: There in one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. The earler mention was again of a void devoid of any interior substance, a space utterly devoid of anything within it. This was cogently dismissed as a concept by Parmenides: "You say there is the void; therefore the void is not nothing; therefore it is not the void." This is in itself sufficient to wholly dismiss the notion of the void, but Plato seems to have gone on undeterred, and so to expand a little on the issue. The essence of the matter is more or less a duplicate of an earlier post on death, repeated below: "Death is non-existence. Non-existence by its very non-nature does not exist. Therefore death does not exist. This might seem a mere elegant play on words, but not actually to be taken seriously. However language meaningfully used is meaningful, and there is nothing false about the given logic. But to look at it slightly differently, but heading towards perhaps the same logical destination, putting into perspective, for example, a writer who is 'obsessed with death', or simply anyone's fear of death. This is all a process of thought, and what is the nature of the thought 'death'? The language term 'death' is an idea or principle of absolute negation and inertia. One cannot be in a state of inertia while engaged in an activity. A concept is an activity of the mind. And so the very idea of death as absolute inertia contradicts its very nature as an idea, or activity in which the mind is engaged. An activity cannot produce inertia, and existentially of course activity is itself not inertia. 'Death' is an unintelligible concept: the idea that the mental substance of an idea can be devoid of substance; the idea here of death referring to a state devoid of anything, wholly lifeless. Thought, if true, is a positive emanation of energy. Energy cannot be inertia. It's a contradiction in terms." 

 In an identical way the void is non-existence, and as pointed out, non-existence doesn't exist. The void as an idea of absolute inactivity, wholly without substance, contradicts its very alleged essence as a substance in the form of an idea. But why, since Parmenides' more prosaic point is so self-evident - that a thought is a something, not a nothing, and so the void as a thought of nothing is senseless - does Plato persist with the notion of the void? Plato, in himself and also as embodying a broader view of reality, considers the world of sense perception as fallen, ultimately unreal. This is essentially the gnostic and Manichaean position regarding reality. Reality doesn't seem to conform to what - at least in a particular human mind - spiritual experience and understanding expects or desires - presumably a perfect harmony - and so reality is dismissed as debased and delusional, ultimately unreal, while the idea of this perfect harmony is praised as perfection and real. Which in turn leads towards the notion of the void. This is not to be confused with the pure mind of the Void of Eastern philosophy, which "Void" is not expected to be thought of as anything but a linguistic symbol for this pure consciousness. The Greek void by contrast is specifically a language form, an intellectual creation or form, and revels in the fact of its existence as such. Why are the likes of Plato drawn to this concept of the void as an absolute - the thought which sits atop all other thoughts, the ascendant within the mental hierarchy? It is because, as said, the world of the senses has been decided to be unreal - this in itself of course an idea, and so what is most real should partake least of all of the sensory world, and what partakes least of all being apparently an idea. Ideas are stated to be the purest of substances, and the most pure of these substances is an idea which is utterly self-referential and distinct from the debased world of external reality. And so the void: a pure self-contained idea without reference to the debased world of sense perception. Hence through the ages, and still, the exaltation of the imagined holy landscape of Pure Reason. 

So again the quote from Timaeus: There in one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. So Plato as the extension of his worldview posits the void as the purest of substances, a wholly intellectual substance, not participating in any degree in the fallen world of sense perception. Its existence can only be inferred by the intellect, though since there is by definition nothing to suggest its being, it being wholly absence from this reality, then there is no basis to make the inference, even if the substance made intellectual sense. However as already shown, this intellectual substance doesn't make sense as it contradicts its very alleged nature as an intellectual substance or idea. It purports to be a substance devoid of any substance, which is nonsensical. In essence it amounts to saying you can think of nothing. Thinking must be about something, not nothing. Try thinking of no apple: senseless. It is all simply a matter of wish fulfilment based on a delusional notion of reality. Plato's position is simply an elegantly structured form of madness - the thoughts in one's head real, all else unreal. (I'll assume the elegance.) I'd prefer not to have to read such exasperating forms of delusion, but I suppose it's perhaps informative and necessary as to see where more recent delusional intellectual forms are coming from in which reality is allegedly enclosed, and also in relation to the intellectual history of the totalitarian state which Plato elsewhere champions. I suppose this championing is another triumph, insofar as possible, of imagined pure intellectual form over debased reality.

Socrates, Knowledge

Socrates, it is said, said that his wisdom consisted in the fact of his knowing nothing, and specifically in the knowing the fact of his knowing nothing. He was aware of his own ignorance and that this was what raised him above everyone else; that by contrast they weren't aware of their own ignorance; were labouring under the delusion of knowledge and inhabiting false certainties, and it seems to have been something of a personal mission of his to make them aware of this ignorance.

However if Socrates knew he knew nothing, then the one thing he thought he knew he didn't actually know, as to know anything, such as the knowing of nothing, is to know something, not nothing. To know one knows nothing is obviously a self-contradictory claim.
So he didn't know nothing but something, but the something he thought he knew he didn't even actually know, so in truth perhaps he was right after all: he did know nothing, or rather, he didn't know anything, not that he could know this without contradicting the not knowing of anything. So it transpires that the wisdom in which he imagined his wisdom solely to consist was delusional, imaginary. Which is ironic. And anyway, how could one know nothing? Nothing, since it doesn't exist, isn't something one could know. Knowledge involves knowledge about something, not nothing.

If someone like Socrates but a bit wiser had been around to accost him, in the manner of himself, and engage him in such a cross-examinination of his knowledge, he could have made him look a right fool.

A possibly amusing, possibly related notion:
A man was engaged in discussion with himself. He was convinced of his own madness. "I am mad," he would tell himself. "Ah but if I really was mad I wouldn't be aware of the fact. I would be convinced as to my not being mad. And so my being aware of being mad must mean I am not mad after all."
He was delighted with himself and his cunning. He had outsmarted them all.

Parentheses

He felt himself wholly a part of the times; his times. He was proud of the fact, and why wouldn't he be - this enclosure within parentheses. What could be finer than to be enclosed within parentheses? And what was within these parentheses? The times. And within the times? Him for starters.

Rising

A hot-air balloon, rising, things falling out the basket, hitting the ground, spilling everywhere, the balloon rising faster, more things go tumbling out, now limbs flailing, a man, down he goes, the balloon sails off. What on earth was that all about?

A

A story, that's the convention, isn't it? A story: things happening to some other poor bastard. Unpleasant things; things you wouldn't like to happen to you, but this other fella- that's all right. You get the confirmation of how awful everything is without having to go through the experiences yourself. Which is convenient.

History

History is a great and wonderful sentence progressing towards a full stop, they say. But the nature of the full stop, that's where they differ, some of them, and when it is that we get there. But before we go any further, how, you will ask, while they're atop the onward moving sentence, are they to know where the sentence is going? They look at the earlier part of the sentence and devise rules - of syntax or whatever - and say this is where it's headed, its inevitable destination. And who has the temerity to argue with syntax? Except they don't seem quite clear about these syntactical rules, it's complex...well no, it's simple, even a fool could understand these rules, or even devise them. But anyway, in short, economics of movement: that's what it all comes down to.

But back to the nature of the full stop and when it is that we get there. Generally it seems we're somewhere on the way to getting there, and probably about to get there, while every now and then someone claims we're already after getting there - it's just that we didn't notice we'd got there. And now that we're at the full stop what's there to do but go on as before. The full stop has been reached. What's more to be said, more of the same please. Otherwise what kind of full stop could it be?

But after a while it generally turns out not to be quite the same as before, and so it must be that we haven't got there yet after all. How are we to recognise when we have got there? When it is the same as before, reality and syntax as one.

Psychoanalyst

Psycho-Analyst: Someone who transforms the infinity of the mind into a heap of shit. He anal-ises the psyche.

Torturing Children: Bush's Legacy and Democracy's Failure

excerpt from Henry A. Giroux's forthcoming book, "Hearts of Darkness: Torturing Children in the War on Terror".
Though I wouldn't describe this as a failure of "democracy". For democracy to fail it would have to really be there in the first place.

Puddle

The great writer came to a dirty little puddle which had the temerity to block his path. He could walk around it if he wished, but he didn't wish. So his two hands, between fingers and thumb, clutched, refinely, his trouser legs a little above each knee, and keeping his eyes most closely focused on the little puddle, raising his right leg daintily, he began to step over the obstacle. Life was flowing madly all round him but his concentration was undiverted, he refused to be distracted and safely crossed over, unblemished. He later wrote a beautiful story of his adventure, conveying much if not all of the excitement and danger involved. Upon publication he was praised for his devotion to his craft, the transmutation of perilous and dirty realism into elegant form, and also the deeply polished irony, even with a hint, much to his credit, of self-mockery with which the experience had been recounted.

Steadfast

I am not one to remain through life in one firm steadfast position. How could you live a life like that?- remaining steadfast in the one position. Everyday people pass you by, on the way to work or the shops, and there you are, steadfast; and what's more, expecting to be admired for it, your perpetual immobility, your immovability - for what I suppose would be the point if you weren't observed and admired, by someone other than yourself that is. Not that you couldn't observe and admire yourself, but how could you keep that going with any sense of enthusiasm? Though then again perhaps there's some of us- I'll speak inclusively - who'd be more than glad to spend an entire life - an entire life and more if they could - just so ceaselessly observing and admiring themselves, and all with the utmost, unflagging enthusiasm. So I suppose you could have such a man standing there, steadfast, utterly; outwardly he'd look serious, stern, composed, corporeal - certainly no figure of fun to be laughed at by passers-by - but inwardly the lapping waves of rapture...

Crafted

This sentence has been crafted meticulously, written and re-written countless times. Well no, it was just written once, but I thought if I didn't highlight it in some way it might go unappreciated; fail to rise above the everyday dross and attendant inner sloth that attends all this dross, whereas now, who knows, perhaps it will be appreciated.

Room Again

The windows were shuttered off, admitted no light, and the light within the room was off - that is if there was a light. Darkness, absolute. Absolute darkness. So how did they see? It seems you imagine I am setting some kind of riddle here: how did they see in a room without light? There is no riddle. They didn't see.